"Consistency and communication in committees" (joint with Felix Ketelaar and Mark Le Quement), Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 160, Dezember 2015, 24 –35. We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.
"Information, Authority, and Smooth Communication in Organizations" (joint with Dezsö Szalay) We study a general sender-receiver game with endogenous information. A designer chooses the information that the sender gets to observe with a view to maximizing aggregate surplus. In a world with correlated interests and noisy signals, information creates and resolves conflicts. The optimum from the designer's perspective orthogonalizes the sender's preferred choice and the underlying conflicts between sender and receiver, enabling honest communication of the sender's unstrategically preferred choice. Communication and delegation of decision-rights become outcome equivalent.
"Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication" (joint with Dezsö Szalay) (R&R at the AER) A decision-maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision-maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about each. The decision-maker can either get advice from the expert or delegate decision-making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns his privately optimal action and chooses it. Under communication, advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses from strategic communication. We characterize the communication problems that make the expert acquire information of equal use to expert and decision-maker. In these problems, communication outperforms delegation.
"A Bandit Model of Two-Dimensional Uncertainty" (joint with Julia Wirtz) An agent is faced with a task where she is uncertain whether success can be achieved through effort or if is only her natural ability that counts. Moreover, she does not know her own ability level. Thus, she is confronted with two-dimensional uncertainty. In each period, after deciding whether to exert effort or not, the agent observes a success or a failure and updates her beliefs about both the task and her ability accordingly. The agent gains information even when she is not exerting effort, therefore the task can be understood as a restless bandit. We characterize the agent's optimal strategy and show that different agents react to failure in different ways; while some agents find it optimal to resign, others prefer to increase their effort. Moreover, the optimal strategy may also include repeated starting and stopping of exerting effort.